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MEN OF DECISION. This photograph of the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff of the American Armed Forces was taken Jan. 4 at the Pentagon. From left to right are Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations; General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
(DoD Photo by Frank E. Hall)

COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

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President Again Reduces Troop Strength In South Vietnam; 100,000 By December

"Between May 1 and December 1 of this year, 100,000 more American troops will be brought home from South Vietnam. This will bring the total number of American troops withdrawn from South Vietnam to 365,000. That is over two-thirds of the number who were there when I came into office . . ."

Those are the words of President Richard Nixon in his April 7 address to the Nation via radio and television on the additional reduction of U.S. Forces from South Vietnam.

The following is the President's entire statement:

Good evening my fellow Americans. Over the past several weeks you have heard a number of reports on T.V., radio and in your newspapers on the situation in Southeast Asia.

I think the time has come for me as President and as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces to put these reports in perspective, to lay all the pertinent facts before you and to let you judge for yourselves as to the success or failure of our policy.

I am glad to be able to begin my report tonight by announcing that I have decided to increase the rate of American troop withdrawals for the period from May 1 to December 1. Before going into details, I would like to review briefly what I found when I came into office, the progress we have made to date in



reducing American forces, and the reason why I am able to announce a stepped-up withdrawal without jeopardizing our remaining forces in Vietnam and without endangering our ultimate goal of ending American involvement in a way which will increase the chances for a lasting peace in the Pacific and in the world.

When I left Washington in January

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of 1961, after serving eight years as Vice President under President Eisenhower, there were no American combat forces in Vietnam. No Americans had died in combat in Vietnam.

8 Years Later

When I returned to Washington as President eight years later, there were 540,000 American troops in Vietnam. Thirty-one thousand had died there. Three hundred Americans were being lost every week and there was no comprehensive plan to end the United States involvement in the war.

I implemented a plan to train and equip the South Vietnamese; to withdraw American forces; and to end American involvement in the war just as soon as the South Vietnamese had developed the capacity to defend their country against Communist aggression. On this chart, on my right, you can see how our plan has succeeded. In June of 1969, I announced a withdrawal of 25,000 men; in September, 40,000; in December 50,000; April of 1970—150,000. By the first of next month, May 1, we will have brought home more than 265,000 Americans, almost half of the troops in Vietnam when I took office.

Our Goal

Now another indication of the progress we have made is in reducing American casualties. Casualties were five times as great in the first three months of 1969 as they were in the first three months of this year, 1971. South Vietnamese casualties have also dropped significantly in the past two years. One American dying in combat is one too many. Our goal is no American fighting man dying anyplace in the world. Every decision I have made in the past and every decision I make in the future will have the purpose of achieving that goal.

Let me review now two decisions I have made which have contributed to the achievements of our goals in Vietnam that you have seen on the chart.

The first was the destruction of enemy bases in Cambodia. You will recall at the time of that decision, many expressed fears that we had widened the war; that our casualties would increase and our troop withdrawal program would be delayed. I don't question the sincerity of those who expressed these fears. But we can see now they were wrong. American troops were out of Cambodia in 60 days; just as I pledged they would be. American casualties did not rise. They were cut in half. American troop withdrawals were not halted or delayed. They continued at an accelerated pace.

Now let me turn to the Laotian operation. As you know, this was undertaken by South Vietnamese ground forces with American air support against North Vietnamese troops which had been using Laotian territory for six years to attack American forces and allied forces in South Vietnam. Since the completion of that operation, there has been a great deal of understandable speculation—just as there was after Cambodia—whether it was a success or a failure, a victory or a defeat. But, as in Cambodia, what is important is not the instant analysis of the moment, but what happens in the future.

Laotian Operation

Did the Laotian operation contribute to the goals we sought? I have just completed my assessment of that operation and here are my conclusions:

First, the South Vietnamese demonstrated that without American advisers they could fight effectively against the very best troops North Vietnam could put in the field.

Second—the South Vietnamese suffered heavy casualties. But, by every conservative estimate the casualties suffered by the enemy were far heavier.

Third, and most important, the disruption of enemy supply lines, the consumption of ammunition and arms in the battle has been even more damaging to the capability of the North Vietnamese to sustain major offensives in South Vietnam—than were the operations in Cambodia ten months ago.

Consequently tonight—I can report that Vietnamization has succeeded. Because of the increased strength of the South Vietnamese, because of the success of the Cambodian operation; because of the achievements of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos I am announcing an increase in the rate of American withdrawals. Between May 1 and December 1 of this year, 100,000 more American troops will be brought home from South Vietnam. This will bring the total number of American troops withdrawn from South Vietnam to 365,000. That is over two-thirds of the number who were there when I came into office, as you can see from this chart on my left. The Government of South Vietnam fully supports the decision I have just announced.

Total Withdrawal

Now, let's look at the future:

As you can see from the progress we have made to date and by this announcement tonight, the American involvement in Vietnam is coming to an end. The day the South Vietnamese can take over their own defense is in sight. Our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and we will reach that goal through our program of Vietnamization if necessary.

We would infinitely prefer to reach it even sooner—through negotiations. I am sure most of you will recall that on October 7 of last year in a national T.V. broadcast, I proposed an immediate release of all prisoners of war in the Indochina area; an all Indochina Peace Conference; the complete withdrawal of all outside forces; and a political settlement. Tonight I again call on Hanoi to engage in serious negotiations to speed the end of this war. I especially call on Hanoi to agree to the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war throughout Indochina. It is time for Hanoi to end the barbaric use of our prisoners as negotiating pawns and to join us in a humane act that will free their men as well as ours.

Let me turn now to a proposal which at first glance has a great deal of popular appeal. If our goal is a total withdrawal of all our forces, why not announce a date now for ending our involvement? Well, the difficulty in making such an announcement to the American people is that I would also be making that announcement to the enemy. And it would serve the enemy's purpose and not our own.

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COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

Editor John R. German

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New DoD Policy Governs Investigative Procedures Within Defense Department

A comprehensive, Department-wide policy directive governing the acquisition of information about and from persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense has been implemented by DOD.

Included are organizational changes to provide more formalized, more clearly understood, and more direct civilian control of investigative and related counterintelligence activities within the Defense Department.

The new policy guidance is included in DOD Directive 5200.26, "Defense Investigative Program," dated Feb. 17, and DOD Directive 5200.27, "Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense," dated Mar. 1. The separate Services are to issue their respective implementing regulations on the new policy on or before May 1, 1971.

The guidance in DOD Directive 5200.27 is explicit and one Defense official familiar with the program put it this way: "It allows for certain things and it prohibits certain things in the investigative field. It is applicable to all military installation commanders.

"What this means," he continued, "is that there now exists a single civilian organization supervising military investigative activities in accordance with the new policies issued by the Defense Department. Also, it means that commanders can no longer—on their own—send their military investigators into the community for installation security or for any other reason, unless it is consistent with DOD Directive 5200.27."

Get Approval

For example, an installation commander suspects there could be trouble in the civilian community surrounding his installation which could affect him. His new policy guidance tells him he must first get approval authority from the Secretary of his Military Department before he can put his investigators into the civilian community unless the threat is so immediate as to preclude obtaining prior approval.

This is new policy and now in being. The events leading up to its establishment date back to the 1960s, but the implementing action came into sharp focus in December 1970.

A memorandum was issued Dec. 23, 1970, by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird in which he stated: "I want to be certain that Department of Defense intelligence and counterintelligence activities are completely consistent with Constitutional rights, all other legal provisions, and national security needs.

"These activities," Secretary Laird added: "must be conducted in a manner which recognizes and preserves individual human rights. Policy determinations governing such activities must be retained under civilian cognizance and control."

On Feb. 18, 1971, Secretary Laird announced the reorganization of military and investigative and related counterintelligence activities in order to further strengthen civilian control.

Resource Manager

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration) Robert F. Froehlke was assigned the added duty of being resource manager for Defense intelligence matters and was delegated the responsibility of directing, managing and inspecting military investigative and related counterintelligence activities by Secretary Laird.

At the same time, Secretary Laird announced establishment of a Defense Investigative Review Council (DIRC) composed of senior civilian officials to assist Mr. Froehlke.

The Council, in addition to Chairman Froehlke, consists of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, the Under Secretary of each of the Military Departments and a single military member of the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DIRC reports directly to the Secretary of Defense.

Robert F. Froehlke, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, tells newsmen at a press conference Feb. 18 there "now exists a single civilian organization supervising military investigative activities in accordance with new policies issued by the Defense Department."

(DoD Photo by Frank E. Hall)

To insure direct and continuing civilian control, the Under Secretary of each of the Military Departments has been assigned responsibility for the conduct of military investigative and related counterintelligence activities in his department.

As directed by Secretary Laird, Mr. Froehlke's first interest was the review of all policy directives relating to the conduct of investigative activities in the Department of Defense. In addition, he was directed to inform the Congress and the public of the changes which were being made in policy and organization.

Sufficient Analysis

Although it was not possible to evaluate in depth every allegation concerning unauthorized military involvement in civilian affairs, a sufficient analysis was possible to adequately support several general conclusions to justify both concern and corrective actions.

To begin with, allegations of military

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TROOP STRENGTH DROPS

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If the United States should announce that we will quit regardless of what the enemy does, we would have thrown away our principal bargaining counter to win the release of American prisoners of war; we would remove the enemy's strongest incentive to end the war sooner by negotiation; and we will have given enemy commanders the exact information they need to marshal their attacks against our remaining forces at their most vulnerable time.

The issue very simply is this: Shall we leave Vietnam in a way that—by our own actions—consciously turns the country over to the Communists? Or shall we leave in a way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive as a free people? My plan will end American involvement in a way that would provide that chance. The other plan would end it precipitately and give victory to the Communists.

Hope Over Despair

In a deeper sense, we have the choice of ending our involvement in this war on a note of despair or on a note of hope. I believe as Thomas Jefferson did, that Americans will always choose hope over despair. We have it in our power to leave Vietnam in a way that offers a brave people a realistic hope of freedom. We have it in our power to prove to our friends in the world that America's sense of responsibility remains the world's greatest single hope for peace.

And above all, we have it in our power to close a difficult chapter in American history, not meanly, but nobly— so that each one of us can come out of this searing experience with a measure of pride in our Nation, confidence in our own character, and hope for the future of the spirit of America.

I know there are those who honestly believe that I should move to end this war without regard to what happens to South Vietnam. This way would abandon our friends. But even more important, we would abandon ourselves. We would plunge from the anguish of war into a nightmare of recrimination. We would lose respect for this Nation, respect for one another, respect for ourselves.

I understand the deep concerns which have been raised in this country, fanned by reports of brutalities in Vietnam. Let me put this into perspective.

I have visited Vietnam many times, and speaking now from that experience and as Commander-in-Chief of our Armed Forces, I feel it is my duty to speak up for the two and a half million fine young Americans who have served in Vietnam. The atrocity charges in individual cases should not and cannot be allowed to reflect on their courage and their self-sacrifice. War is a terrible and cruel experience for a nation and it is particularly terrible and cruel for those who bear the burden of fighting.

But never in history have men fought for less selfish motives—not for conquest, not for glory, but only for the right of a people far away to choose the kind of government they want.

Acts of Generosity

While we hear and read much of isolated acts of cruelty, we do not hear enough of the tens of thousands of individual American soldiers—I have seen them there—building schools, roads, hospitals, clinics—who, through countless acts of generosity and kindness, have tried to help the people of South Vietnam. We can and we should be very proud of these men. They deserve not our scorn but they deserve our admiration and our deepest appreciation.

The way to express that appreciation is to end America's participation in this conflict, not in failure or in defeat, but in achievement of the great goals for which they fought—a South Vietnam free to determine its own future and an America no longer divided by war but united in peace.

That is why it is so important how we end this war. By our decision we will demonstrate the kind of people we are, and the kind of country we will become.

That is why I have charted the course I have laid out tonight. To end this war —but to end it in a way that will strengthen trust for America around the world, not undermine it; in a way that will redeem the sacrifices that have been made, not insult them; in a way that will heal this Nation, not tear it apart.

I can assure you tonight with confidence that American involvement in this war is coming to an end.

But can you believe this? I understand why this question is raised by many very honest and sincere people. Because many times in the past in this long and difficult war, actions have been announced from Washington which were supposed to lead to a reduction of American involvement in Vietnam. Over and over these actions resulted in more Americans going to Vietnam and more casualties in Vietnam.

Reduced Casualties

Tonight I do not ask you to take what I say on faith. Look at the record. Look again at this chart on my left. Every action taken by this Administration, every decision made, has accomplished what I said it would accomplish. They have reduced American involvement. They have drastically reduced our casualties.

DoD Establishes TRI-TAC Office

A new management office has been established in the Department of Defense to coordinate the development and acquisition of selected tactical communications equipment for joint use by the military services.

Army Brigadier General Harold W. Rise has been designated director.

Named TRI-TAC to indicate tri-departmental activities in tactical communications, the new office will function under the policy and direction of Louis A. deRosa, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications.

The basic mission of the new organization is to insure maximum effectiveness and economy in future development, programming and acquisition of jointly used communications equipment for tactical forces.

A TRI-TAC Steering Group, which will assist Mr. deRosa, will include representatives of the Military Departments, Defense Communications Agency, National Security Agency, Defense Research and Engineering, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Consultants from industry and educational institutions will be utilized as required.

SEASON'S FIRST BALL. Army Master Sergeant Daniel Pitzer, representing President Richard Nixon, throws out the first ball at Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Stadium in Washington, D.C., during major league opening day ceremonies April 5. With Sergeant Pitzer in the President's box were the sons and daughters of five U.S. military men who are listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia, Pitzer's 14-year-old son Donald, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, American League President Joe Cronin, Washington Senators' owner Bob Short, and Air Force Brigadier General Daniel "Chappie" James Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). The Washington Senators blanked the Oakland Athletics, 8-0.

(DoD Photo by Frank E. Hall)

In my campaign for the Presidency, I pledged to end American involvement in this war. I am keeping that pledge. And I expect to be held accountable by the American people if I fail.

I am often asked what I would like to accomplish more than anything else while serving as President of the United States. I always give the same answer—to bring peace—peace abroad, peace at home for America. The reason I am so deeply committed to peace goes far beyond political considerations or my concern about my place in history, or the other reasons that political scientists usually say are the motivations of Presidents.

Every time I talk to a brave wife of an American POW, every time I write a letter to the mother of a boy who has been killed in Vietnam, I become more deeply committed to end this war, and to end it in a way that we can build a lasting peace.

I think the hardest thing that a President has to do is to present posthumously the nation's highest honor, the Medal of Honor, to mothers or fathers or widows of men who have lost their lives, but in the process have saved the lives of others.

Sergeant Karl Taylor

We had an award ceremony in the East Room of the White House just a few weeks ago. At that ceremony I remember one of the recipients, Mrs. Karl Taylor, from Pennsylvania. Her husband was a Marine sergeant, Sergeant Karl Taylor. He charged an enemy machine gun single handed and knocked it out. He lost his life. But in the process the lives of several wounded Marines in the range of that machine gun were saved.

After I presented her the Medal, I shook hands with their two children, Karl, Jr.—he was eight years old—and Kevin, who was four. As I was about to move to the next recipient, Kevin suddenly stood at attention and saluted. I found it rather difficult to get my thoughts together for the next presentation.

My fellow Americans, I want to end this war in a way that is worthy of the sacrifice of Karl Taylor, and I think he would want me to end it in a way that would increase the chances that Kevin and Karl, and all those children like them here and around the world, could grow up in a world where none of them will have to die in war; that would increase the chance for America to have what it has not had in this century—a full generation of peace.

We have come a long way in the last two years toward that goal. With your continued support, I believe we will achieve that goal. And generations in the future will look back at this difficult, trying time in America's history and they will be proud that we demonstrated that we had the courage and the character of a great people.

Thank you.

Official Quotes Voice Concern On PW/MIA Issue

Private sector and official concern for the plight of American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia and the anguish of PW/MIA families did not begin nor end with the National Week of Concern proclaimed by President Richard Nixon for March 21-27 this year.

Many other public officials, including many Members of the Congress, representatives of the State Department, and a large segment of the American citizenry have also voiced frequent protests against the enemy's attitude toward and treatment of Americans captured or missing in Southeast Asia.

The callous manner in which the North Vietnamese and their agents in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia continue to refuse to apply the humane standards of the 1949 Geneva Convention has evoked the protests of millions of Americans.

As private efforts supported by public officials continue, world censure of the enemy's inhumane practices can help bring relief to hundreds of valiant American servicemen who are prisoners of war and to the families and friends who have waited so long.

The following selection of quotations are taken from statements made by the President, Department of Defense officials, and a U.S. representative in Committee III of the United Nations:

"No Presidential statement on Vietnam would be complete without an expression of our complete concern for the fate of the American prisoners of war. The callous exploitation of the anxieties, the anguish of the parents, the wives, the children of these brave men as negotiating pawns is an unforgivable breach of the elementary rules of conduct between civilized peoples.

"We shall continue to make every possible effort to get Hanoi to provide information on the whereabouts of all prisoners, to allow them to communicate with their families, to permit inspection of prisoner-of-war camps, and to provide for the early release of at least the sick and the wounded."

President Richard Nixon
April 20, 1970

". . . the Communist's . . . callous policy is in violation of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, to which North Vietnam acceded in 1957, and it is in contempt of established customs among civilized nations and of ordinary human decency."

President Richard Nixon
April 29, 1970

"As I have indicated, and as everyone I am sure would agree, as long as the North Vietnamese have any Americans as prisoner-of-war, there will be Americans in South Vietnam and enough Americans to give them an incentive to release the prisoners."

President Richard Nixon
February 17, 1971

"All of us in the Department of Defense are fervently working and praying for the early return of the hundreds of men who are prisoners of war. We pray, too, that the enemy will agree to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention concerning the care and treatment of prisoners of war."

Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense
May 1, 1970

"The other side has referred to our prisoners and missing men as 'just 1500 men.' In America we value each individual. We particularly value the safety of these men who have sacrified so much for our country . . . Those who are held in Southeast Asia and their families know that they are not forgotten, and we will not let them down."

Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense
November 24, 1970

"The Geneva Convention further requires regular inspection of all prisoner of war facilities by a qualified impartial body such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. There has been no such inspection of any of the Communist camps in North Vietnam, South Vietnam or Laos. This contrasts with the PW camps in South Vietnam, where the Republic of Vietnam holds about 37,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong prisoners. These camps are regularly inspected by the ICRC. Deficiencies, if any, are corrected. ICRC inspectors may, at their choosing, talk with any of the prisoners held by the South Vietnamese, privately or in groups."

Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense
January 26, 1971

"In recent weeks, Ambassador Bruce has laid great stress on the issue of the American prisoners of war and missing in action in Southeast Asia . . . It is essential that we continue to focus attention on the plight of these men and their families. We shall not rest until the prisoners are returned to their families to live out their lives in peace."

Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense
January 28, 1971

". . . the Department of Defense will press unrelentingly for full adherence by Hanoi to the provisions of the Geneva Convention. What we want from the enemy is a complete and official identification of all men who are prisoners, including civilian newsmen, and a full accounting of all military and civilians who are missing."

Daniel Z. Henkin
Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Public Affairs)
June 26, 1970

"Our concern for the individual nowhere is manifested more deeply in our

thoughts, in our actions, and in our prayers than in the situation which confronts our prisoners of war.

"Let me repeat: We will never forget these men or their families. We will be ceaseless in our determination to do all that is possible to obtain for these men and for their families the rights which are due them under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, to which North Vietnam is a signator."

Brig. Gen. Daniel James Jr., USAF
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
April 14, 1970

". . . many people don't realize that there are prisoners being held in the South by the Viet Cong under conditions even more brutal than the men held in the North . . . The North Vietnamese have never put out a list including any of the people in the South. The Viet Cong has never put out a list at all."

Brig. Gen. Daniel James Jr., USAF
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
December 30, 1970

"The Geneva Convention was never intended to doom prisoners of war to endless years of incarceration. Article 109 of the Geneva Convention requires, unconditionally, that all seriously sick or wounded prisoners of war be repatriated as soon as they are fit to travel. Given the conditions under which our men have been held for so long, most of our men would qualify for immediate release under this provision alone."

Richard A. Ware
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
September 23, 1970

". . . man's inhumanity to man apparently has not diminished. Nowhere is this better seen than in the communist's handling of our prisoners in North and South Vietnam. We know 376 of our servicemen are captives in North Vietnam, and we know another 75 are prisoners in the South. But what is not generally known is that 1,102 are unaccounted for, and we have no idea how many of these are living and captured. Nor have the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong offered any solace. What is especially disturbing is that we can account for only 75 prisoners being held in Cambodia or in South Vietnam. Yet in the South, 481 are missing, some of whom may be captive.

"To help solve this agonizing dilemma, we should make every effort to overcome any Viet Cong or North Vietnamese designs to have us overlook our missing servicemen in the South, and it appears evident to me that their strategy is to have us overlook this group. Despite the pleas of our negotiators, the statements of our Congress and the sincere request of our President, the communists have not demonstrated the common decency to tell the mothers or the wives whether these young men are alive or dead. No argument can support such a basic violation of humanitarian principles.

All must remember, as Milton stated, 'They also serve who only stand and wait.' The hollow hours of waiting for the release of loved ones . . . the quiet desperation of their longing for confirmation . . . can never be measured or atoned for."

General W. C. Westmoreland, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff
June 27, 1970

". . . many of these men have been prisoners . . . longer than any American has been a prisoner of war in our nation's history . . . in all the modern history of man's inhumanity to man, there is no example of crueler or more inhumane treatment than that being dealt to our prisoners of war and their families by the North Vietnamese."

John H. Chafee
Secretary of the Navy
December 1, 1970

"A special note, as I promised myself never to give a speech without referring to it, has to do with the tragic plight of our prisoners of war . . .

"Let us at this moment resolve that we will in our respective ways insure that our country continues to focus on them and the need to bring every pressure of which we are capable to bear, to get their release."

Admiral E. R. Zumwalt Jr., USN
Chief of Naval Operations
November 21, 1970

". . . I feel obligated to mention one of the gravest problems concerning our military people and the Nation. That is the plight of our prisoners of war and missing in action personnel. The completely inhumane actions by the North Vietnamese to refuse to honor the provisions of the Geneva Convention, which it signed in 1957, has caused untold anguish to our men and their families. . . .

"Our government is doing everything possible to obtain the release of these men and to have North Vietnam abide by the Geneva Convention. These men have earned and deserve our untiring efforts to seek their release—to let them know that we have not forgotten them."

General John D. Ryan, USAF
Chief of Staff
January 26, 1971

"Right now 115 Marines and their loved ones are being put to the severest test of our principles. These Marines are being held as prisoners of war or are missing in action in Southeast Asia. There is so little that can be said, there are no adequate words. We can only say you are not forgotten, you will never be forgotten. God, be with you, as our hearts are with you."

General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., USMC
Commandant
November 8, 1970

". . . this [Geneva] Convention is not meant to create a life of privilege for captured military personnel. It is meant to insure minimum standards of human decency to helpless men who are in the power of their military enemy and can no longer pose a threat to that enemy, and to provide minimum solace to families who are far from the front lines. In wartime, when passions are inflamed, this Convention seeks to preserve those frail links of compassion and decency which are so urgently needed. Nurtured, these links may in turn help move enemies toward a realization of their common stake in finding the path to peace."

Mrs. Rita E. Hauser
United States Representative in Committee III of the United Nations
November 11, 1969

NEW DOD POLICY

(Continued From Page Three)

involvement in domestic affairs and of surveillance of individuals, organizations and activities in the civilian community, were often exaggerated, but contained sufficient substance to justify concern and corrective actions.

Second, the requirements, imposed by high civilian authorities on the Armed Forces, came primarily in periods of crises. From the vantage point of hindsight, these requirements now appear to have been too imprecise and too often issued orally, rather than in written form.

Third, despite the continual and increasing level of demand by civilian officials for adequate planning and timely information with respect to potential civil disturbances, no formal, comprehensive guidance was provided to the Armed Forces by appropriate authorities on the collection by military organizations of information related to civil disturbances.

Fourth, once the reluctance of the Armed Forces to become involved in civilian affairs was overcome, the policy directives of the Services were too often over-responsive.

Fifth, some investigations did occur in which organizational elements or individual investigators over-reacted in their quest for information.

Sixth, the data collected, but seldom disposed of, resulted in large accumulations of information which, in some cases, were stored in automated data file systems.

Actions Initiated

Mr. Froehlke made it clear that, beginning in 1969, departmental actions were initiated to reassess the degree of involvement of military investigative and related counterintelligence activities in the civilian community.

Mr. Froehlke said he had concluded that there are three general areas where missions assigned to the Department of Defense require, and will continue to require, the collection of information from, or related to, the civilian community. These are:

1. There is a requirement for the Armed Forces to collect information in connection with the protection of Defense installations and personnel. For example, a local commander must maintain close liaison with local, State and Federal authorities in the event of any threat to his base or his personnel. Information must be obtained for the purpose of determining what precautions are required in local base security.

2. The Department of Defense must investigate the background of military and civilian employes in order to provide a basis for granting access to classified material. Similarly, employes of private contractors requiring such access must be investigated through the Department of Defense Industrial Security Program.

3. The military, primarily the Department of Army, have missions related to civil disturbances when authorized or when directed by the President.

Policy Is Clear

Mr. Froehlke has stated that the new policy makes it very clear that the military does have responsibilities in all of the above areas, but these are very definitely and very precisely spelled out as to their limitations.

Generally, here is what the new DOD Directive (5200.27) accomplishes:

—It establishes general policy, limitations, procedures, and guidance on the collection, processing, storing, and dissemination of information on non-DOD civilians.

—It prohibits such activities unless essential to the accomplishment of specific missions.

—It allows for acquisiton only in cases of subversion, theft, jeopardizng DOD elements by compromise of classified defense information or espionage, unauthorized demonstrations on Department of Defense facilities, direct threats to Department of Defense facilities, direct threats to Department of Defense personnel, activities endangering facilities having classified contracts, and crimes for which Department of Defense has investigative responsibility.

—It prohibits physical or electronic surveillance of Federal, State, or local officials or candidates; covert or otherwise deceptive surveillance (unless specifically authorized by the Secretary of Defense).

—It prohibits attendance by Department of Defense personnel at public or private meetings for the purpose of acquiring information unless direct threat and the immediacy of the situation makes it impossible to obtain individual specific approval, and it also prohibits computerized data banks.

—It clearly spells out the reliance of DOD on the Department of Justice and local authorities. The Directive limits access to any information collected to Governmental agencies requiring such information in the execution of their duties.

—It requires destruction of any collected information within 90 days, unless the Secretary of Defense authorizes retention. Additional retention guidelines will be issued by DIRC.

Absolute Control

The program is applicable throughout the Defense Department and provides for absolute civilian control and direction of military investigative activities as outlined in DOD Directive 5200.27.

This delegates the authority to act for the Secretary of Defense in the direction, management and review of the Defense Investigative Program to Mr. Froehlke as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration.

Another important aspect of the Directive is that it establishes responsibility for military departmental activities in the Under Secretaries of each of the Military Departments.

As Chairman of the Defense Investigative Review Council, Mr. Froehlke has a number of responsibilities including the establishment of policy; conduct of inspections; the assignment of tasks to Department of Defense components; a review of all programs, budgets, and financial programs; supervision of relationships with other Governmental investigative agencies, and any functions assigned by the Secretary of Defense.

He said he sees his new assignment "will include a significant managerial role" and believes that "the establishment of the DIRC will permit the Department of Defense to exercise the control over these activities which I know that the Congress and the Military Departments wish to see established."

Mr. Froehlke added that the DIRC has already started to take action, and that the Council was the principal instrument through which the new policy and program directives were coordinated.

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